

EFFECTS OF PARTIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF NEGOTIATION OUTCOMES ON PERFORMANCE OF CIVIL SERVANTS IN KWARA STATE, NIGERIA

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Abstract: The study explored possible effects of partial implementation of negotiation outcomes on performance of civil servants in Kwara State, Nigeria. Using descriptive survey research design, the 382 respondents used for the study were drawn from different stratum of civil servants in Kwara state, Nigeria. Stratified, proportionate and convenience sampling techniques were used at different stages of the study. Primary data used for the study were collected through semi-structured questionnaire and were analysed using mean, standard deviation and Logit model. The findings of the study revealed a negative but significant relationship between partial implementation of negotiation outcomes and performance of civil servants in Kwara State, Nigeria. It recommends that government and other employers of labour should ensure full implementation of negotiation outcomes to encourage worker's full commitments to their jobs thereby enhancing their performance. Also, both parties to negotiation should come with clean and open minds to the negotiation table.

Keywords: Implementation, Partial Implementation, Negotiation, Labour, Negotiation Outcome, Performance.

1. INTRODUCTION

In recent times, Nigeria has witnessed a considerable increase in the number of industrial actions. In most cases, labour has to adopt strikes as a means of pressing home their demands from the employers to the extent that strikes have become endemic in Nigeria. Hardly would a year pass without an industrial action from one labour union to another across states and sectors especially in government-owned establishments. Presently, all the labour unions in the public universities both federal and state in Nigeria are on strike due to partial or non-implementation of the agreements reached with them over years. For instance, the issue of thirty thousand naira (₦30, 000) minimum wage established by the act of parliament and signed into law in 2019 by the country's president expected to be paid to all workers in Nigeria is unsettled in majority of the states in Nigeria. Most state governors in Nigeria had resulted to partial and what can be called selective implementation in their respective states. While some states had chosen to pay the minimum wage of ₦30, 000 to levels one to six of the civil servants to start with, other states which had started had either stopped or postponed the implementation due to

dwindling resources. This has called for strikes by civil servants in some of these states. It is interesting to note that Kwara state in Nigeria is not an exception. The civil servants in Kwara state have had cause to engage in recurring strikes due to partial or non-implementation of the negotiation outcomes which had impacted negatively on their performance. The failure of Kwara state government to implement the negotiation outcomes led to the Joint Kwara Labour Congress including TUC to direct the state workers to commence industrial action to press home their demand for the implementation of negotiation outcomes of the new minimum wage.

Few studies have been conducted on implementation of negotiation outcomes in Nigeria, yet majority of these studies were in the food and beverages, educational institutions and banking sectors mostly in southwest and south-south geo-political zones in Nigeria concentrating on industrial conflict management and harmony. The study by Onyeizugbe, Aghara, Olohi and Chidiogo [2018] investigated the extent of relationship that exists between industrial harmony and employee performance in selected Food and Beverage Firms in Anambra state, Nigeria. Ajike, Babatunde, Magaji and Sonubi [2015] examined effect of conflict management on organizational performance in Access Bank Plc, Lagos. Kolawole [2019] investigated effect of industrial conflict on employee performance in a private sector organisation, a case of Ikeja Electricity Distribution Company Plc. Patrick [2015] examined the critical involvement of trust as compelling factor in managing party's conflict in workplace negotiations in Baylisa state Nigeria. Mba [2013] addressed the extent of the relationship between conflict management strategies and employee performance and management perception of the effectiveness of conflict management strategies in Julius Berger Nigeria Plc. Bonny Island, River state, Nigeria. Even the study conducted by Asamu, Abiola, Ogadimma and Bamidele [2019] from the North Central Region of Nigeria in which Kwara state belongs examined industrial conflict and collective bargaining.

It is evidently clear that it is yet to be determined the possible effect implementation of negotiation outcomes may have on performance of civil servants in the North-central geo-political zone of Nigeria, especially Kwara state. In view of the above, this study examined the effects of partial implementation of negotiation outcomes on performance of civil servants in Kwara state, Nigeria.

2. MATERIAL AND METHODS

2.1 Materials

Negotiation, according to Gottschal [2003], is an occasion where one more representatives of two or more parties interact in an explicit attempt to reach a jointly acceptable position on one or more divisible issues about which they would like to agree. Robins and Brown [2005] defined negotiation as the process whereby two or more parties decides what each party will give and take in an exchange between them. Okwonkwo [2006], defined negotiation as the "give and take" trading process by which the conditions of a transaction are agreed and acted upon; an attempt by two parties to complete a transaction through the use of bargaining.

Implementing an agreement means that the conflict parties act to put that agreement into operation, thus ending the dispute. The agreement reached between Federal government and labour in 2011 was dully signed by the parties, and it was aimed at alleviating poverty, and to resolve a long period of workers suffering due to inflation that has eating deep into the worker's salary. Unfortunately, most of the governors that sat on roundtable to sign the agreement refused to implement the agreement throughout the country, and those that implemented it, only partially paid some categories of their workers while others were paid amputated salaries, especially, Kwara State government that paid workers on grade level 01 to 07 of the agreed minimum wage, while those on grade level 08 and above were paid amputated salaries. The resultant effect was threat upon threat and strike actions by the workers, till the latest minimum wage of ₦30, 000 was signed in to law in 2019. Though, their argument was based on paucity of fund. Whereas most of them were into white elephant projects which crate room for inflated contracts, giving room for corruption. The government seem to see worker's salary as if it is not a right, hence, they can play around with it, forgetting that workers are being paid for the job done.

Most agreements require that the conflict parties continue to carry out specific actions and to behave in certain ways. The success of an agreement depends on the implementation plan and the process that puts this plan into operation. The ability of the parties to carry out the terms of the agreement and their sense of ownership in it are other factors. In other words, the ability and willingness of the conflicting parties to adhere to the agreement, monitoring procedures to track the implementation process, enforcement procedures to deal with non-compliance with the agreement, and the role and authority of the authorities or even external monitors (if applicable) are all necessary for success.

Agreements can be framed in a variety of ways. These are determined by the preferences of the participants and frequently by the nature of the issues being discussed or agreed upon. In the detailed agreement that results from the negotiating process' conflict management, participants occasionally desire to incorporate an implementation plan. When the agreement has been formally acknowledged in these situations, the negotiations are over. In other situations, parties may prefer to negotiate implementation and monitoring separately or as part of an ongoing negotiation process. In these situations, the agreement will obligate the disputing parties to talk over and plan future implementation and monitoring.

Monitoring and implementation plans are ultimately the duty of the negotiation parties, who must be capable and motivated to follow them, regardless of the method employed to achieve them. Therefore, agreements must always be based on the parties' honest assessments of their respective levels of willingness and capability. When mediators or other dependable third parties act as neutral monitors who may help resolve any issues that may develop, the negotiation sides may occasionally feel more assured.

The parties involved in the conflict determine the precise responsibilities of a neutral monitor. They must choose whether to utilize a neutral monitor and whether an existing mediator or a different third party should take on this responsibility. When determining if the trusted third party can perform such a task, especially when time and resources are required to be provided, great attention must be used. Moore, C. W. [2014].

2.2 Methods

The study adopted descriptive survey research design. The 382 respondents used for the study were drawn from different stratum of civil servants in Kwara state, Nigeria. Multi-stage sampling technique was used for the study. Stratified, proportionate and convenience sampling techniques were used at different stages of the study. The first stage involved proportionate sampling from each ministry, department and agency (MDAs) as depicted in Table 2.1. The second stage involved stratification of employees into three categories namely junior staff, middle level management and top level management while the third stage involved selection of each respondent using convenience sampling technique. Primary data used for the study were collected through semi-structured questionnaire and were analysed using mean, standard deviation and Logit model.

Table: 2.1 Computation of proportionate sampling by MDAs

1	Government House $\frac{382(5)}{8702} = 1$	15	Governor's Office $\frac{382(13)}{8702} = 1$
2	Head of Service $\frac{382(1305)}{8702} = 57$	16	Min of Agric $\frac{382(472)}{8702} = 20$
3	Min of Communication $\frac{382(196)}{8702} = 9$	17	Min of Education $\frac{382(332)}{8702} = 15$
4	Min Energy $\frac{382(160)}{8702} = 7$	18	Min of Enterprises $\frac{382(480)}{8702} = 21$
5	Ministry of Environment $\frac{382(234)}{8702} = 10$	19	Min of Finance $\frac{382(891)}{8702} = 39$
6	Ministry of Health $\frac{382(2212)}{8702} = 97$	20	Min of Justice $\frac{382(96)}{8702} = 4$
7	Min of Local Govt. $\frac{382(154)}{8702} = 6$	21	Min of Social Develpt $\frac{382(280)}{8702} = 12$
8	Min of sport Youth & Dev. $\frac{382(102)}{8702} = 9$	22	Min of Tert Education $\frac{382(146)}{8702} = 6$
9	Min of Water Resources $\frac{382(114)}{8702} = 5$	23	Min of Works $\frac{382(588)}{8702} = 26$
10	Bureau of Land $\frac{382(154)}{8702} = 6$	24	Bureau of Statistics $\frac{382(261)}{8702} = 11$
11	Civil Service Commission. $\frac{382(26)}{8702} = 1$	25	Fiscal Responsibility $\frac{382(4)}{8702} = 1$
12	Local Govt Audit $\frac{382(142)}{8702} = 6$	26	Mass Agency $\frac{382(18)}{8702} = 1$
13	Office of Survey $\frac{382(39)}{8702} = 2$	27	Physical Planning $\frac{382(141)}{8702} = 611$
14	State Audit $\frac{382(137)}{8702} = 3$		

Source: Author's computation, 2021

3. RESULTS

The results of the descriptive statistics used for the study is presented in Table 3.1

Table 3.1: Mean and Standard Deviation Computed for the Variables of Partial Implementation of Negotiation Outcomes

S/N	Variable	N	MEAN	STD	RANK	Remark
1	Partial implementation of negotiation outcomes reduces workers performance	370	4.48	0.74	1 st	Seriously affected Employee Performance
2	Partial implementation of negotiation outcomes encourages absenteeism of employees	370	4.04	1.31	8 th	Affected Employee Performance
3	Partial implementation of negotiation outcomes leads to uncertainty in the work environment	370	4.24	0.87	4 th	Seriously affected employee performance
4	Partial implementation of negotiation outcomes is inimical to a long lasting relationship between labour and management	370	4.15	0.92	6 th	Affected Employee Performance
5	Partial implementation of negotiation outcomes increases staff turnover	370	4.06	0.99	7 th	Affected Employee Performance
6	Partial implementation of negotiation outcomes leads to breach of trust between labour and management	370	4.21	0.80	3 rd	Seriously affected employee performance
7	Partial implementation of negotiation outcomes often encourages labour unrest	370	4.36	0.75	2 nd	Seriously Affected Employee Performance
8	Partial implementation of negotiation outcomes is inimical to job satisfaction	370	4.15	0.89	5 th	Affected Employee Performance

Source: Researcher's Field work, 2022

****Acceptable Mean= 3.00**

****STD = Standard Deviation**

**** Ranked was carried out on the basis of STD**

**** A test item seriously affected employee performance if Ranked < 5th position or otherwise it affected employee performance**

Table 3.1: presents the mean and standard deviation computed for the distribution of respondents' perception for the variables of partial implementation of negotiation outcome. Looking at the result in the table, it was observed that sufficient number of the respondents agreed that partial implementation of negotiation outcomes reduced workers' performance. This inferred was premised on the fact that the mean value computed for the test item of 4.48 was greater than the acceptable mean of 3.00 with a standard deviation of 0.74 that showed a slight dispersion from the mean. The consequence of non-implementing negotiation outcome fully might cause reduction in employee performance. It was discovered that substantial number of the respondents agreed that partial implementation of negotiation outcome encouraged absenteeism of employee. This assertion was premised on the fact that the mean value calculated for the test statement of 4.04 was far better than the acceptable mean of 3.00 with a standard deviation of 1.31 that showed a relative dispersion from the mean. The mean value obtained for the test item of 4.24 was greater than the acceptable mean of 3.00 with a standard deviation of 0.87 that showed a slight variability from the mean. This implied that partial implementation of negotiation outcomes encouraged uncertainty at work. This might affect negatively the business of the organization due to employee unrest that could cause possible shut down of activities at the Ministries, Departments and Agencies of the Government in Kwara State.

Also, it was noted that substantial numbers of the respondents agreed that partial implementation of negotiation outcomes was inimical to a long lasting relationship between labour and management. This assertion was based on the fact that the mean value computed for the test item of 4.15 was far greater than the acceptable mean of 3.00 with a standard deviation that showed a slight dispersion from the mean. The resultant effect of this was that partial implementation of the agreement

reached by the Government with the State Labour Union could affect the smooth relationship that had existed between the Union and the Government.

Also, it was found from the result in the table that sufficient numbers of the respondents agreed that partial implementation of negotiation outcomes increased staff turnover. This assertion was based on the fact that the mean value calculated for the test item of 4.06 was greater than the acceptable mean of 3.00 with a standard deviation of 0.99 that indicated a slight variation from the mean. This implied that partial implementation of negotiation outcomes added more to employee turnover.

Moreover, adequate numbers of the respondents agreed that partial implementation of negotiation outcomes led to breach of trust between labour and management. This inference was due to the fact that the mean value obtained for the test item of 4.21 was far greater than the acceptable mean of 3.00 with a standard deviation that indicated a slight variation from the mean.

Furthermore, substantial numbers of the respondents agreed that partial implementation of negotiation outcomes often encouraged labour unrest. This inferred was based on the fact that the mean value obtained for the test item of 4.36 was far greater than the acceptable mean of 3.00 with a standard deviation that indicated a slight variation from the mean.

In addition, it was noted that substantial numbers of the respondents agreed that partial implementation of negotiation outcomes was inimical to job satisfaction. This statement was premised on the fact that the mean value computed for the test statement of 4.15 was far better than the acceptable mean of 3.00 with a standard deviation of 0.89 that showed a slight variability from the mean.

Test results of relationship between partial implementation of negotiation outcomes and performance of civil servants in Kwara State.

Table 3.2: Regression Result for the Null Hypothesis (LOGIT) Dependent variable = Employee Performance

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	Z-Calculated	P-value
C	0.983122	1.980888	0.496304	0.6540
LP	-0.831968	0.095138	-8.744855	0.0000
LABT	-0.613734	0.095232	-6.444619	0.0000
LLS	-0.219125	0.071204	-3.077425	0.0213
UCE	-0.719145	0.167617	-4.290406	0.0032
NTR	-0.577969	0.169922	-3.401378	0.0045
LST	-0.832651	0.149508	-5.569274	0.0003
NLLR	-0.450375	0.061192	-7.360031	0.0000
EIU	-0.265029	0.015921	-16.64650	0.0000
C	0.983122	1.980888	0.496304	0.6540
	OTHER	TEST	STATISTICS	
McFadden R-squared	0.926076		Mean dependent var	0.670270
S.D. dependent var	0.470751		S.E. of regression	0.468112
Akaike info criterion	13.283559		Sum squared resid	79.10560
Schwarz criterion	13.378752		Log likelihood	-228.4584
Hannan-Quinn criter.	13.321371		Deviance	56.90168
Restr. Deviance	469.1504		Restr. log likelihood	-34.5752
LR Statistic	129.23361		Avg. log likelihood	-2.617455
Prob (LR statistic)	0.000000			

Source: Researcher's computation's, 2022

** LP = Leads to low productivity

**LABT = Leads to absenteeism

**LLS =Leads to less satisfaction

**UCE = Uncertainty Exists

**NTR = No Trust

**LST = Leads to staff turnover

**NLLR = No Long Lasting Relationship

**EIU = Encourages industrial unrest

Table 3.2 presents the results of the Logit analysis computed for the null hypothesis. Looking critically at the result in the Table 3.2, it was discovered that the p-value of the t-statistics computed for the variable of low productivity (LP) of 0.0000 was less than the critical value of 0.05. This showed that the null hypothesis which stated that low productivity is one of the components of partial implementation of negotiation outcome was not significant on employee performance hence was rejected. On this basis, it was reasonable to assert that low productivity was significant on employee performance. The effect of partial implementation of negotiation outcome on employee performance could not be underestimated. This was because the incidence might result in low productivity, low quality of output, lackadaisical attitude and failure of employee to attend to their responsibilities promptly. The regression coefficient computed for the variable of low productivity was -0.83 and negative signed with significant Z-statistics value of -8.74. This indicated that there was a significant negative relationship between low productivity and employee performance. The implication of this was that a 1% increase in low productivity as a result of partial implementation of negotiation outcome might result in 0.83% reduction in employee performance. The sign of this variable of LP was in tandem with a priori expectation and hence.

It was observed that the p-value of the t-statistics computed for absenteeism of 0.0000 was less than the critical value of 0.05. This showed that the null hypothesis which stated that absenteeism was not significant on employee performance was rejected. It was better to assert that absenteeism was significant on employee performance. Inadequate implementation of negotiation agreement might result in absenteeism of employee from work. High lackadaisical attitude as its related to employee regularity at work might ensue. Employee interest on the jobs and task might diminish resulting in artificial redundancy if the implementation of negotiation outcome was carried out in piece meal instead of fully. The regression coefficient calculated for the variable of absenteeism was -0.61 with significant z-statistics of -6.44. This showed that there was a significant negative relationship between absenteeism and employee performance. The resultant effect of this was that a 1% increase in absenteeism of employee in Kwara State due to failure of the Government to implement the agreement reached with the labour union might lead to 0.61% reduction in employee performance.

The result in the Table further revealed that the p-value of the z-statistics calculated for the variable of less satisfaction of 0.0213 was less than the critical value of 0.05. This indicated that the null hypothesis which stated that less satisfaction was not significant on employee performance was rejected. It was reasonable to assert that less satisfaction was significant on employee performance. The regression coefficient obtained for this variable was -0.22 with significant z-statistics of -3.08. This revealed that there was a significant negative relationship between less satisfaction of employee on the jobs and employee performance. The implication of this was that a 1% increase in the incidence of less satisfaction as a result of partial implementation of negotiation outcome could result in 0.22% reduction in employee performance.

The result in the Table further indicated that the existence of uncertainty was significant on employee performance. This inference was based on the fact that the p-value of the Z-statistics computed for the variable of uncertainty existed at 0.0032 was less than the critical value of 0.05. Partial implementation of negotiation outcome could result in uncertainty in the work place. This was because with partial implementation of negotiation outcomes employee might be in the dark as to what their future career prospects and advancement hold. The regression coefficient computed for the test item of -0.72 was negative with significant Z-statistics value of -4.29. This implied that there was a significant positive relationship between UCE and employee performance. The resultant effect of this was that a 1% increase in the level of uncertainty in Kwara State civil service might lead to 0.72% decrease in employee performance.

It was discovered that partial implementation of negotiation outcome might lead to no trust between the employee and employer. This assertion was based on the fact that the p-value of the Z-statistics computed for the variable of NTR of 0.0045 was less than the critical value of 5%. The implication of this value was that the failure of the Government of Kwara State to implement the outcomes of agreement reached with labour partially might lead to lack of trust between the civil servants and the Government. The regression coefficient computed for the variable of NTR was -0.58 with significant Z-statistics of -3.40. This revealed that there was a significant negative relationship between variable of no trust due to partial implementation of negotiation outcome and employee performance. The resultant effect of this was that a 1% increase in the incidence of no trust might lead to 0.58% decrease in employee performance. Moreover, it was noted that partial implementation of negotiation outcomes might cause increase in staff turnover and this might have a significant effect on the performance of civil servants in Kwara State. This statement was premised on the fact that the p-value of the Z-statistics computed for LST of 0.0003 was less than the critical value of 5%. The regression coefficient obtained for the test item was -0.83 with significant Z-statistics of -5.57. This revealed that there was a significant negative relationship between LST

and employee performance. This further implied that a 1% increase in staff turnover as result of partial implementation of negotiation outcome might lead to 0.83% reduction in employee performance.

Also, the result in the Table indicated that relationship and employee performance was significant. This assertion was based on the fact that the p-value of the Z-statistics calculated for the variable of no longer lasting relationship of 0.0000 was less than the critical value of 0.05. The resultant effect of this was that partial implementation of negotiation outcomes might lead to poor relationship between the civil servants and Government. The regression coefficient obtained for the test variable was -0.45 with significant Z-statistics value of -7.36. This indicated that a 1% increase in the incidence of partial implementation of negotiation might lead to loss of relationship between employee and employer. This might result further in 0.45% decrease in employee performance.

Looking further at the result in the Table, it was discovered that the p-value of the Z-statistics computed for the variable of partial implementation of negotiation outcomes encouraged industrial unrest of 0.0000 was less than the critical value of 0.05. This showed that partial implementation of negotiation outcome encouraged industrial unrest and was significant on employee performance. With partial implementation of negotiation outcomes, employee could be forced to go on strike. The regression coefficient computed for the test variable was -0.27 with significant Z-statistics of -16.65. This implied that a 1% increase in industrial unrest might cause 0.27% decrease in the performance of civil servants in Kwara State.

The result of other test statistics revealed that partial implementation of negotiation outcomes might contribute negatively to employee performance. For instance, the McFadden R^2 obtained for the test of 0.93 showed that approximately 93% decline in employee performance might be recorded if partial implementation of negotiation outcomes was not adequately addressed in Kwara State civil service. Moreover, the p-value of the LR-statistics computed for partial implementation of negotiation outcomes of 0.0000 was less than the critical value of 0.05 with significant statistics of 129.23. This indicated that the joint null hypothesis which stated that partial implementation of negotiation outcome had no significant effect on performance of the civil servants in Kwara State was rejected. It was save to assert that partial implementation of negotiation outcome had significant effect on performance of the civil servants in Kwara State. Therefore, partial implementation of negotiation outcomes and employee performance were negatively related.

4. DISCUSSION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS

The study highlights a number of factors of partial implementation of negotiation outcomes and their possible effects on employee performance especially among government workers which government, employers of labour, civil servants and other employees in private sector will find useful in boosting employee performance in their different sectors. The study revealed a negative but significant relationship between partial implementation of negotiation outcomes and employee performance. Also the study showed that partial implementation of negotiation outcomes encourages low productivity, absenteeism, less satisfaction, lack of trust and uncertainty among government workers. In addition, the study revealed that the major consequences of partial implementation of negotiation outcomes were employee turnover, industrial unrest and no lasting relationship. The result of this study is in agreement with the study of Asamu, Abiola, Ogadimma and Bamidele (2019) which examined industrial conflict and collective bargaining: evidence from North Central Region of Nigeria. The findings of their study showed that negotiating via the process of collective bargaining on the terms and conditions of employments were not satisfied to the employees in the way the management of the institution handle them. The findings of this study also corroborated the study of Kolawole (2019) which investigated effect of industrial conflict on employee' performance in a private sector organization: a case of Ikeja Electricity Distribution Company Plc. Their study revealed that poor management of conflict arising from and inter-organisation and intragroup relations and individual employees as well as ineffective conflict resolution procedures affect employees' performance negatively.

The implication of this was that with partial implementation of negotiation outcomes, the Government might lose her best staff on the jobs to private sectors. Staffs that were not satisfied with the way the Government had been implementing the negotiation outcomes with the civil servants had high potential of leaving the service to private sector and other organizations where their demand and welfares could be adequately taken care of. Furthermore, it implied that partial implementation of negotiation outcomes encouraged staff turnover and increased the desire of the workers to seek for greener pasture elsewhere and increased the cost of in-service training within an organization.

The study concluded that partial implementation of negotiation outcomes negatively affects employee performance. It is therefore recommended that government and other employers of labour should ensure full implementation of negotiation

outcomes to encourage worker's full commitments to their jobs thereby enhancing their performance. Also, employers of labour should endeavour to do away with empty promises. Furthermore, at the negotiation table both parties should come clean with open minds.

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